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Liability of Foreignness in Global Stock Markets:  







Using a unique dataset of foreign and domestic IPOs listings in the US from 1990 to 2012, we 
study how foreignness affects IPO liquidity. We find that foreign IPOs enjoy higher liquidity 
than IPOs in their home countries, but do not fully gain the same liquidity benefits as for IPOs 
of domestic US issuers. In contrast to prior evidence for mature cross-listed firms, we show that 
liquidity differentials between foreign and domestic IPOs in the US are determined by 
information asymmetry related to foreignness rather than to home-country institutional 
environment characteristics. Thus, our results extend prior findings to reveal salient differences 
in liquidity and liquidity determinants between IPOs offerings by foreign and domestic firms 
in the US. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The effect of foreignness in the international business literature has traditionally been investigated in the 
context of globalized product markets (Zaheer, 1995; Mata and Freitas, 2012). This study contributes 
empirically to an emerging conceptual discussion regarding the effects of foreignness in international capital 
markets (e.g., Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012; Filatotchev, Bell and Rasheed, 2016). Specifically, we 
examine whether firms that conduct initial public offerings (IPOs) abroad enjoy the same liquidity advantages 
as local host market firms, or rather suffer from a “liability of foreignness”.1,2 A foreignness liquidity liability 
is salient for foreign IPOs, both because of their increasing numbers and because they differ in important 
regards from firms that cross-list with documented benefits for capital costs (Pagano, 1993; Pagano et al., 
2001), corporate governance (Peng and Su, 2014), strategic decision making (Markovitch, Steckel and Yeung, 
2005; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Foucault and Frésard, 2012; Peng and Su, 2014), product scope, growth, and 
valuation (Gande et al., 2009). Liquidity is a key determinant of these benefits and is cited as a primary 
motivator for foreign listings (e.g., Saudagaran, 1988; Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995; Blass and Yafeh, 2001; 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Karolyi, 2006). Yet the relation between foreignness and IPO liquidity, a 
key component of transaction costs in capital markets, remains largely unexamined to date. 
We examine IPOs on US exchanges from 1990 to 2012, which dominate in numbers and capitalization, 
with two sets of findings. First, we find that foreign IPO shares are systematically less liquid than comparable 
domestic US IPOs. This liquidity differential indicates that foreign IPOs continue to experience frictions 
described in Bell et al. (2012) despite the net benefits to their listings. We argue that information asymmetries 
are a key source of these frictions, documenting that underpricing differentials are significant determinants of 
the liquidity liability. We further find that uncertainty plays a role as foreign firms with more volatile shares 
exhibit larger liquidity differentials than comparable domestic IPO listers. Second, we extend institutional 
                                                            
1 Zaheer (1995: 343) defines foreignness as reflecting “all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs 
that a local firm would not incur”, yet prior studies have focused primarily on transportation and coordination costs, 
unfamiliarity with foreign institutions, and perceived legitimacy of foreign firms (for a comprehensive review see 
Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen, 2011).  
2 We define liquidity as the ease of trading a desired quantity of a specific financial asset quickly and at low cost (Kyle, 
1985; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
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bonding theory regarding how a firm’s home country institutions affect its “liquidity discount” in an overseas 
capital market. Specifically, we provide evidence that foreign shares are not regarded differently from each 
other with respect to liquidity based upon their home country institutions. This finding contrasts with prior 
evidence for cross-listed shares, whose liquidity is strongly influenced by home country institutional 
characteristics. 
Considered altogether, our findings reveal salient differences in liquidity between foreign and domestic 
IPO listings and cross-listings in the US that are consistent with related informational asymmetries, thereby 
serving to extend and clarify prior findings regarding the net benefits and costs of foreign listings (Bell et al., 
2012). In particular, our findings document a “liability of foreignness” for foreign versus domestic US listings 
that in part offsets the net liquidity advantage of listing in the US rather than in a home country market. 
Importantly, we find in contrast to prior findings for foreign US cross-listed firms, that liquidity for foreign 
IPO firms is not significantly influenced by their home country institutional environments, consistent with 
added information asymmetry. In this regard, our findings are consistent with a domestic investor information 
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign investors, irrespective of foreign locale (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 
2009), where the absence of alternative and not perfectly connected trading venues does not impose additional 
liquidity costs as for cross-listed shares (Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998). Finally, we generalize the 
findings by Blass and Yafeh (2001) for Israeli firms listed abroad to show that on average foreign IPO firms 
enjoy a higher level of liquidity in US markets than their home market liquidity. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature and formulates our hypotheses. 
The following section provides a description of the data. The empirical analysis and robustness tests appear 
in following sections, with the final section providing a discussion and summary. 
 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Liquidity in IPOs 
Among factors identified by prior research as influencing firms’ decisions to list abroad, a key motivation 
is enhanced liquidity as confirmed by surveys of CFO intent (e.g., Saudagaran 1988; Fanto and Karmel, 1997; 
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Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Doidge et al., 2004; Karolyi, 2006). More specifically, firms that list abroad in deep 
and liquid markets have been found to benefit from reduced capital constraints and costs, more informative 
feedback from stock prices, and enhanced strategy, investment and growth options (e.g., Pagano et al., 2001; 
Doidge et al., 2004; Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz, 2007; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Francis, Hasan, Lothian and 
Sun, 2010; Foucault and Frésard, 2012; Mortal and Reisel, 2013). More liquid shares are also associated with 
value-enhancing shareholders’ activism and monitoring (Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004; Edmans, Fang 
and Zur, 2013; Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele, 2015), notably for cross-listing firms (Fresard and Salva, 
2010). Nonetheless, Bell et al. (2012) argue that foreign firms also may be subject to frictions arising from 
information asymmetries and institutional differences when accessing overseas capital markets that offset 
these benefits. 
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) identify bonding with US institutions as a key source of these 
benefits for foreign firms listing in the US. In addition to legal bonding, they argue that access to reputable 
intermediaries and institutional investors contributes to the reduction of agency problems and information 
asymmetries. These benefits may extend beyond the initial offering since underwriters tend to become market 
makers after completing their price stabilization role (Ellis et al., 2002). In addition, specialists’ portfolios that 
focus on certain types of shares may improve their ability to extract information and reduce information 
asymmetries. Corroborating evidence indicates that firms are more likely to list in a foreign market that has 
the largest peer presence from the same industry and country (e.g., Caglio, Weiss Hanley; Marietta-Westberg, 
2016). However, evidence is limited regarding potential offsetting effects to foreignness for IPOs, for which 
information availability is more limited compared to cross-listings, and which have come to dominate as a 
listing mode for prominent classes of foreign listers.3 
Of particular relevance to foreign listings is liquidity. For cross-listings, prior studies find that foreign 
shares are systematically less liquid than domestic ones (Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Bacidore, Battalio, 
                                                            
3 Baker, Biddle, Lowry and O'Connor (2017) observe that “whereas Chinese firm U.S. listings via reverse merger 
(CRMs) have dominated prior media, regulator and research attention regarding financial reporting quality, CRMs have 
effectively ceased, leaving listings via initial public offering (CIPOs) the relevant remaining class of Chinese firms on 
the U.S. exchanges.” 
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Galpin and Jennings, 2005), with the strength of home country institutions a determinant of this liquidity 
(Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006). Specifically, cross-listing has been found to help 
mitigate adverse liquidity effects of poor home country institutions (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Stulz, 
2009; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010). However, cross-listing creates the potential for improvements or 
reductions in market quality depending on home-market transparency (Domowitz et al., 1998; Bacidore and 
Sofianos, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), with the presence of alternative and imperfectly connected 
trading venues increasing the potential for both informed trading and increased costs associated with dealing 
across markets (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). However, foreign firms listing in the US via IPOs by nature will 
be less influenced by home country institutions and by cross-market information flows regarding home 
country share trading. They also differ from cross-listers in other regards that may influence liquidity. 
First, regulatory and disclosure requirements play a role in firms’ decision to list abroad (Biddle and 
Saudagaran, 1991). In particular, when foreign firms transition from private to public ownership in the US 
they must follow the same Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) registration procedures as domestic 
firms,4 and abide by the same stock exchange listing requirements. By comparison, cross-listed firms can file 
preliminary registration statements confidentially with the SEC, resolve many issues without public 
disclosure, and list with expedited exchange reviews. IPO firms listing in the US via these more stringent 
reporting and review requirements have thus been argued to bond more closely to US institutions relative to 
cross-listed firms, thereby helping to alleviate agency and asymmetric information problems and reduce their 
cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bell et al., 2012). Possible countervailing effects include the absence of prior 
trading history, their unfamiliarity more broadly to domestic investors, and the lack of comparable home 
country liquidity measures. 
Second, foreign IPO shares listed and traded on US markets, while traded in a variety of alternative 
venues, are largely consolidated (O’Hara and Ye, 2011). This contrasts with cross-listed firms that trade 
simultaneously in two or more markets and may have a longer trading history in their home country markets. 
                                                            
4 This includes publishing preliminary and subsequent amendments to the registration statements. For more details see 
SEC website https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml.  
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Even so, US liquidity may be related to home institutions in terms of audit standards, legal disputes, regulation 
and broader reputational effects (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Siegel, 2005). 
Third, IPO shares have been found to experience different liquidity dynamics in the early months relative 
to non-IPO shares, and in particular, exhibit high trading volume on the NYSE and NASDAQ (e.g., Ellis et 
al., 2002; Corwin, Harris and Lipson, 2004). We track and plot these dynamics for our foreign and domestic 
IPO samples to document liquidity differences between them. 
Following this reasoning, we provide initial evidence regarding the effect of foreignness on IPO liquidity 
by testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Foreign IPOs listing in the US experience a liquidity disadvantage relative to comparable 
domestic IPOs. 
Following Blass and Yafeh (2001), who argue that Israeli firms conduct IPOs in the US to access a larger 
and more sophisticated investor pool relative to their domestic market, we also investigate whether firms 
experience greater IPO liquidity in the US versus their home country, by testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Foreign IPOs listing in the US experience a liquidity advantage relative to comparable 
IPOs in their home countries. 
The Role of Home Country Institutions 
Prior studies document for cross-listed shares that home country institutions influence their US liquidity 
(Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006; Stulz, 2009; Doidge et 
al., 2010), with cross-listed firms from less (more) transparent locales exhibiting lower (higher) US liquidity 
(Domowitz et al., 1998; Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). However, for reasons 
detailed above, this finding may not necessarily extend to foreign firms listing by IPO in the US, which we 
test using the following hypothesis in null form:  
Hypothesis 2: The liquidity of foreign IPOs listing in the US is unrelated to the strength of their home 
institutional environment; 
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where home country institutional environment is proxied using the La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) index of anti-director rights as adjusted by Spamann (2010) and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Law and Order index. 
DATA 
Matching Procedure 
Using the Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database, we identify first-time issuers of 
ordinary shares in US markets between 1990 and 2012. To ensure that our foreign IPO sample includes only 
non-US firms with no prior listing in any market inside or outside of the US, we follow Bruner, Chaplinsky 
and Ramchand (2006) to define foreign firms as those incorporated and whose primary executive offices are 
located outside of the US. We eliminate warrants, units, and rights offerings, as well as utility and financial 
firms. Further, we exclude listings in the form of spinoffs from mergers and acquisitions or publicly listed 
companies. Firms that are based in the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda are also excluded, as they are 
often US firms registered in these locations for tax reasons. Finally, we exclude all firms with incomplete 
financial data. Selected variables are manually extracted from each foreign firm’s prospectus obtained from 
the SEC Edgar and Perfect Filing databases, with foreign currency figures translated into US dollars based on 
exchange rates disclosed in the prospectuses. Financial information for domestic and foreign US IPOs is 
obtained from the CRSP and Compustat databases. Institutional ownership holdings are obtained from 
Thomson Reuters. Additional information is obtained from the SDC Platinum database. Finally, we index 
the US figures to 2005 US dollar values based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the 
International Monetary Fund. A detailed description of the proxies employed and data sources are provided in 
the Appendix. 
Our resulting sample used for matched sample comparisons contains 3,374 US IPOs, of which 393 are 
foreign and 2,981 are domestic. The largest industry in both subsamples is the business equipment, comprising 
approximately 35% of the total sample, and 34% and 41% of the domestic and foreign IPOs, respectively. 
Table 1 reports the distributions of foreign IPOs according to country of origin in two periodic windows, 1990-
2001 and 2002-2012. Consistent with prior studies on foreign issuers in the US, the largest number of foreign 
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IPOs in the sample is from Israel (77), followed by China (65), Canada (33), and the UK (32).5 Most IPOs 
(68%) occur before 2001, reflecting the Internet and dot.com bubble and its effect on the high-tech sector that 
motivated many IPOs. We match each foreign IPO firm with the domestic US IPO firm with the same two-
digit industry association, IPO year, and smallest absolute difference in size (log of total assets) at the end of 
the fiscal year preceding the IPO. For robustness, we test alternative matching procedures and we discuss 
these in the robustness tests section. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Measuring Liquidity 
We measure liquidity using the Amihud (2002) ratio that estimates price sensitivity to transaction 
volume. Specifically, we compute the monthly average of the ratio of the daily absolute returns to the dollar 
volume for each stock in the sample, as follows: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = |𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 = ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡=1 ,  (1) 
 
where reti,t is the return of stock i in day t, dvoli,t is the daily trading volume of stock i in dollars and Tm is 
the number of daily observations in month m. We then multiply the measure by 106. Since we are interested 
in liquidity, we also change the sign to obtain LIQi,m, so that higher ratio values reflect higher levels of 
liquidity. 
In a horse race exercise comparing different liquidity measures at different frequencies, Goyenko, Holden 
and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud ratio performs well among proxies for the price impact of 
transactions. To assess the robustness of our findings, we also conduct our analysis using bid-ask spreads as a 
proxy for liquidity as presented in the robustness tests section and Table 7. 
                                                            
5 As robustness checks, we include in the main regressions indicator variables for IPOs from Israel, China, UK and 
Canada separately, then all indicators together, and separately exclude IPOs from each of these countries, with 




Following prior studies, we introduce explanatory variables to control for other influences on liquidity.6 
Specifically, we expect IPOs with more reputable underwriters (Corwin et al., 2004; Mantecon and Poon, 
2009) and more insider ownership (Hahn, Ligon and Rhodes, 2013) to be associated with higher liquidity. 
Following Booth and Chua (1996), we also expect shares of larger IPOs, proxied by their proceeds, to be more 
liquid due to the ease of valuation relative to smaller deals. 
A large strand of literature investigates the relationship between underpricing and secondary market 
liquidity. Several studies find that firms engage in higher levels of underpricing in order to offset the costs 
associated with information asymmetry problems and to increase market liquidity (e.g., Booth and Chua, 1996; 
Hahn et al., 2013). Other studies document a signaling effect of underpricing that helps to attract a larger 
investor base and more analyst coverage (e.g., Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2002). In addition, higher 
liquidity is positively related to higher institutional investors’ ownership since firms tend to attract institutional 
investors through higher initial underpricing of their shares (Zheng and Li, 2008). Overall, these studies point 
toward a positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity. Contrary to these works, Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) find a positive relationship between underpricing and the probability of informed trading, which is a 
proxy for illiquidity. They argue that first-day returns are offered to investors as compensation for the risk of 
holding shares with lower expected liquidity. A possible reason for the contradictory results may be the 
different market setting analyzed in Ellul and Pagano (2006). As the authors concede, they study the UK 
market in which underwriters are less likely to provide market-making services after the initial listing (see also 
Ljungqvist, 2003). In the US context, Ellis et al. (2002) document an active role of lead underwriters as 
subsequent market makers and suggest that a link may exist between underpricing and profitable post-IPO 
trading activities of underwriters. More recently, Ellis (2006) confirms a significant role of lead underwriters in 
post-IPO trading accounting for the growing importance of alternative trading venues such as electronic 
communication networks (ECNs). Another possible explanation may be related to a nonlinearity effect. 
                                                            
6 Data sources and expected signs are provided in the Appendix. 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Following the observation that IPO shares are on average more liquid than non-IPO shares, Ligon and Liu 
(2011) note that the liquidity risk premium documented in Ellul and Pagano (2006) is likely to arise in the less 
liquid segment of US IPO shares. In fact, Ligon and Liu (2011) find that only the less liquid IPOs registered 
a drop in underpricing following improved liquidity conditions on the NASDAQ after a change in trading 
regulation. To account for the different trading protocols in the various trading venues of the US stock market, 
we control for the NYSE and NASDAQ in a robustness test and confirm the main results.7 The differing 
results also may be attributable to the liquidity proxies employed (see Hahn et al., 2013). Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) focus on the impact of informed trading on liquidity by using the probability of informed trading and 
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, liquidity is a broad concept that 
encompasses several dimensions (Kyle, 1985). Thus, it is reasonable that studies that do not focus on a specific 
information component but employ measures related to the price impact of transactions or overall transaction 
costs (including the inventory and market-making costs) also offer different insights (Hahn et al., 2013). For 
these reasons, and since we focus on the price impact of transactions captured by the Amihud (2002) measure, 
we expect to find a positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity.8 
In addition to IPO characteristics, stock characteristics may also affect liquidity levels. Several studies 
have documented that assets with higher contemporaneous returns and lower volatility are more liquid (Stoll, 
1978, Amihud, 2002, among others). Furthermore, recent evidence shows a positive relationship between 
liquidity and institutional ownership (Zheng and Li, 2008; Hahn et al., 2013). Thus, we expect shares with 
higher returns, lower volatility and higher institutional ownership to have a higher level of liquidity. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for each variable and the results of univariate analyses comparing 
the means of these variables between foreign and US domestic IPOs. On average, foreign firms are larger 
(SIZE), less levered (LEV), and marginally more undervalued (BtoM) than domestic US IPOs. On average, 
foreign IPOs are also larger in terms of proceeds (PROC) and insider ownership (INSIDER). Underpricing 
                                                            
7 Results are not tabulated for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
8 Given the inconclusive evidence in the literature, we excluded underpricing from all the tests as a robustness exercise 
and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
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(UP), underwriter quality (UW), and market returns prior to listing (HOT) are not statistically different. 
While returns (RET) and volatility (VOL) are not statistically different, on average, foreign shares have 
significantly less institutional ownership (HOLD) than domestic shares across all horizons. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients. As expected, we find that firm size is positively and 
significantly correlated with book-to-market, proceeds, and underwriter quality. In addition, larger and more 
leveraged firms experience lower volatility and more institutional ownership after listing. Underpricing is 
larger when recent market returns and insider holdings are higher. Moreover, underpricing is positively related 
to volatility. With respect to IPO proceeds, smaller IPOs are associated with more volatile shares and lower 
institutional ownership. Finally, shares with higher quality underwriters have also larger institutional 
ownership. 
[Table 3 about here] 
RESULTS 
Initial evidence regarding the liquidity of foreign and matching US domestic IPOs is shown in Figure 1. 
Panel A illustrates that liquidity levels measured using the Amihud ratio of foreign and matching domestic IPO 
shares. Both exhibit higher liquidity in the immediate post-listing time period, followed by falling liquidity 
levels over a longer time horizon. This pattern is consistent with prior findings regarding trading volume for 
IPOs. In this respect, Corwin et al. (2004) show that trading volume and the level of depth of limit order 
books of NYSE specialists stay higher than normal for the first month of listing. For the NASDAQ, Ellis et 
al. (2002) find that the trading volume of newly issued shares is particularly high until it stabilizes after three 
months of trading. By comparison, average bid-ask spreads in Panel B begin at high levels and decline 
through time as found by Ellul and Pagano (2006). Importantly, both Panels A and B exhibit significant 
differences in liquidity between foreign and domestic US IPOs, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, with foreign 
(domestic) IPOs exhibiting larger Amihud ratios (bid-ask spreads) in Panels A and B, respectively. 
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Liquidity Differences Between Foreign and Domestic US IPOs 
To formally test whether foreign IPOs face a systematic liquidity disadvantage relative to comparable 
domestic IPOs, we examine liquidity differences between foreign and domestic US IPOs using both univariate 
and multivariate tests. As presented in Table 4 (Panel A), we find that differences are significant across all 
time periods, with foreign IPO shares less liquid than those of matched domestic counterparts. These findings 
are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude from the sample the IPOs that took place during the bubble period 
of 1999-2000 (as in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 2003).9 In a robustness test reported in the robustness tests 
section and Table 7, we also confirm these findings for liquidity measured using the bid-ask spread. 
To shed light on underlying reasons for these observed liquidity differences, and to control for other 
influences on liquidity, we compare foreign and matching domestic IPO firms in a multivariate setting. 
Specifically, we regress liquidity differences between matched domestic and foreign IPO shares on the 
differences in explanatory variables as follows: 
 (2) 
 
where ∆LIQi,m is the difference between the matched domestic and foreign stock i of the daily 
Amihud ratio averaged over month m. ∆FIRM are the differences in firm characteristics - i.e., recent sales, 
book-to-market, and leverage ratio. ∆IPO are the differences in IPO characteristics - i.e., underpricing, IPO 
proceedings, insiders, underwriter quality, and recent market returns. ∆STOCK represents the differences in 
stock characteristics - i.e., return, volatility, and institutional ownership. 
Table 4 (Panel B) reports results for the regression analysis. The positive and significant constant (α) 
confirms the results of the univariate analysis: a systematic positive liquidity differential exists between 
domestic and foreign shares. Moreover, larger differentials in underpricing are related to larger differences in 
liquidity between domestic and foreign shares. These findings suggest that foreign firms have to offer larger 
underpricing (resulting in lower underpricing differentials) in order to reduce their liquidity differentials over 
                                                            
9 Results are unreported for brevity, but available from the authors upon request. 
, , , ,
for  = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24 and 36 months.
i m m m i m m i m m i m mLIQ FIRM IPO STOCK
m
α β γ δ ε∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
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comparable domestic firms.  This effect is relevant up to one year after the IPO. Moreover, lower liquidity 
differentials are associated with larger differences in underwriter quality and lower differences in insider 
ownership up to six months following the listings. After that period, shares of the two groups share more 
similar liquidity levels for larger volatility differentials (i.e. foreign shares are less volatile). 
[Table 4 about here] 
Thus, we find that liquidity differences are related to asymmetric information, which is neither attenuated 
nor offset by underpricing and reputable underwriters. In addition, we find that liquidity differences are related 
to foreign shares’ higher volatility that leads to lower liquidity levels. 
Global IPOs and Multiple Trading Venues 
In this section, we extend the study of the underlying reasons for these observed liquidity differences by 
explicitly taking into account the role of multiple trading venues. On one hand, trading across venues may 
lead to a wider investor base and reduce information asymmetry between market participants (e.g., dealers 
and investors) resulting in lower transaction costs and higher liquidity (e.g., Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002). 
On the other hand, prior findings suggest that the presence of alternative and imperfectly connected trading 
venues may increase information asymmetry between market participants and thus impose additional liquidity 
costs for cross-listed shares (Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998). 
We estimate equation (2) for the global IPOs in our sample to determine whether foreign IPOs that list 
in multiple exchanges face lower liquidity disadvantages relative to comparable domestic IPOs.10 Results 
reported in Table 5 document the presence of a liquidity disadvantage relative to comparable domestic IPOs 
(Panel A), where in the multivariate setting, this liquidity disadvantage is generally weaker and declines 
through time (Panel B). Moreover, the two key determinants in the main analysis above are not evident for 
this subsample. Specifically, underpricing, underwriter rank, and volatility do not significantly influence 
                                                            
10 Global IPOs are firms that go public in multiple exchanges at the same time. This set of firms is generally larger than 




liquidity differential in global IPOs. In untabulated results we also estimate equation (2) for the full sample, 
but excluding global IPOs, and we find that these determinants are significant and correctly signed, in line 
with the main results above.11 
[Table 5 about here] 
Overall, these findings suggest that the wider investor base and information flow that arises from the 
presence of multiple trading venues reduces information asymmetry and improves the liquidity of foreign 
stocks in the US.12 
A Comparison with Home Market Liquidity 
Extending the finding in the previous section that shares of foreign IPOs enjoy less liquidity than shares 
of comparable US domestic IPOs, we focus in this section on Hypothesis 1b, that foreign IPOs listing in the 
US experience a liquidity advantage relative to comparable IPOs in their home countries. Considering 
liquidity at issuance, we conduct two sets of comparisons. First, we compare the liquidity level of the foreign 
shares in the US to the market liquidity in the home stock market. Given that foreign IPO firms are generally 
larger than their domestic counterparts (Bruner et al., 2004; Caglio et al., 2016), we compare the liquidity of 
foreign IPO shares to home market liquidity measured by the value-weighted average of the Amihud ratio 
(changed of sign to measure liquidity) of all shares that comprise the home country stock market index. We 
find that the liquidity of foreign shares in the US is significantly higher than the liquidity of the home country 
stock market. Specifically, the average liquidity of foreign IPO shares in the first month of listing is -0.05 
compared with an average home market liquidity of -0.22.13 
Second, focusing on Canada, China, Israel, and the UK, we gather data on domestic IPOs in these markets 
                                                            
11 For robustness, we confirm the results for the alternative liquidity measure, the bid-ask spread (untabulated). 
12 Comparing our results with mature cross-listed evidence in prior literature, we infer that our foreign IPO sample is 
sensibly less liquid than mature cross-listed stocks. Bacidore & Sofianos (2002) report an average spread of 1.17% for 
non-US stocks (1.62% for emerging non-US) listed on the NYSE in the sample period of their analysis, that is July 1998. 
We conduct a similar test for foreign IPOs listed in the US in 1998 and find a spread of 2.77%. Global IPOs are different 
from mature cross-listers since they do not have any previous transaction history at the time of listing. 
13 Due to lack of data for the calculation of the Amihud ratios for certain countries, the sample size is 301 foreign IPOs. 
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in the same year, country, and industry as the foreign IPOs in our samples. We then build the average Amihud 
measures of the matching domestic newly listed shares at the same horizons and compare them to the Amihud 
ratios of our foreign IPOs in the US. The average liquidity of US foreign IPO shares in the first month of 
listing is -0.16 while the average liquidity of home country IPO shares is lower at -2.19.14 We find that on 
average, foreign IPOs in the US are more liquid than domestic IPOs in their home markets. Thus, even though 
they suffer from a “liability of foreignness”, foreign firm IPOs still enjoy higher liquidity by listing in the US 
rather than in their home markets. 
Home Country Institutions 
In this section, we consider Hypothesis 2 that the liquidity of foreign IPOs listing in the US is unrelated to 
the strength of their home institutional environment. We measure the strength of home institutions (HOME) 
using the product of two measures. The first is the La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
index of anti-director rights, as adjusted by Spamann (2010).15 The second is the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Law and Order index.16 We use the product of these two measures because the anti-director 
rights index covers only aspects of de-jure regulation captured by six sub-indices indicating the letter of the 
law, not its enforcement in practice (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). By comparison, 
the Law and Order index assesses the de-facto law and order traditions including enforcement and legal 
system. We then assign a country-year score according to the year of the IPO and its home country to 
capture both de-jure and de-facto aspects of investor protection (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 
2010; Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera, 2014). We next divide the sample into strong (weak) home institutions 
sub-samples according to whether the country’s score falls above (below/at) the sample median of the product 
of these two measures. The indicator HOME is set equal to one if the country’s score is above the sample 
                                                            
14 Due to lack of data availability for the matching of IPO shares, the sample is 55 foreign IPOs. 
15 Spamann (2010) shows that his revised index markedly differs from both the La Porta et al. (1998) original index as 
well as its later revision that is provided in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). 
16 Retrieved from http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx. Since both Spamann (2010) and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2006) do not provide measures for China, for the first and second measures we use the values for China from 
Ding, Nowak and Zhang (2010).  
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median and zero otherwise.17 
Table 6 (Panel A) reports univariate tests for differences in means. In contrast to prior findings for cross-
listed firms, the results show no significant liquidity differences between foreign IPOs listing in the US from 
countries with weak versus strong institutional environments. 
To control for other influences on liquidity, we next the following multivariate model that includes 
controls and the home institutional strength estimators: 
LIQi,m = αm + θmHOMEi,m + βmFIRMi,m + γmIPOi,m + δmSTOCKi,m  + cm for m = 1, 2, 3, 
6, 9, 12, 24, 36     months;                                                                                         (3) 
 
where LIQi,m is the daily Amihud ratio of foreign stock i averaged over month m. FIRM are the firm 
characteristics - i.e., recent sales, book-to-market, and leverage ratio. IPO are the IPO characteristics - i.e., 
underpricing, IPO proceedings, insiders, underwriter quality, recent market returns, and SOX for listing 
following the introduction of the SOX Act. STOCK are the share characteristics - i.e., return, volatility, and 
institutional ownership. As presented in Table 6 (Panel B), the multivariate results confirm the univariate 
results in finding no significant impact of home institutional environment on the liquidity of foreign IPO shares 
listed in the US, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Measuring liquidity alternatively using the bid-ask spreads, we find that shares of foreign firms from 
countries with weaker institutions are on average less liquid than those from countries with stronger 
institutions in the univariate tests at 2 months (at 1% significance level), 3 months (at 1% significance level), 
6 (at 5% significance level) months and 12 months (at 10% significance level) after their IPO. However, these 
differences are insignificant in the multivariate setting and thus do not provide robust evidence of a consistent 
liquidity difference related to home country institutions after controlling for other liquidity determinants. 
Overall, our findings for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2 indicate that foreign firms obtain a liquidity advantage 
                                                            
17 An alternative approach is to calculate the median score for each year and thus HOME is set to one if the country’s 
score in a particular year is above that year’s median. However, country scores are very stable and little difference results 
between the measures. 
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by conducting their IPOs in the US rather than in their home country markets, they nevertheless still suffer 
from a “liability of foreignness” compared with US domestic IPOs that does not relate to the quality of their 
home institutional environment as was found previously for foreign US cross-listed shares. These findings are 
consistent with the theoretical model of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) that implies that since 
foreign listing does not solve the information disadvantage of domestic investors in the host country, they 
will be home biased irrespective of the origins of the foreign firm. Beyond this, we find that foreign IPO shares 
experience a liquidity benefit from US listings when compared with index-wide liquidity in their home 
markets that is not significantly influenced by home country institutional environment as found for foreign 
US cross-listed firms. This latter finding is consistent with added information asymmetry for foreign IPO 
versus cross-listings, as IPOs have no prior trading history and no cross-market liquidity measures for market 
participants to compare. This is in line with the findings that when foreign IPOs list in multiple markets (global 
IPOs), their liquidity differences decline as the presence of multiple trading venues reduces information 
asymmetry and improves the liquidity of foreign stocks in the US. 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We first conduct the analysis above with the bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of transaction 
costs measured by subtracting the bid from ask price and scaling the difference by the mid-price (Ellul and 
Pagano, 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2014).18 We confirm that on average the bid-ask spreads of foreign IPO shares 
are higher than for comparable US domestic IPO shares (Table 7, Panel A). Multivariate regression results also 
yield qualitatively similar findings in Table 7 (Panel B). Thus, in addition to a greater price impact of 
transactions, foreign IPO shares have also larger bid-ask spreads than comparable US domestic shares. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Our results also are robust to matching foreign and US domestic shares using market capitalization at the 
end of the first day of trading and propensity score matching by multiple factors. With regard to the latter, we 
follow the propensity score matching procedure in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Gao, Harford 
                                                            
18 Daily closing bid and ask prices are available from CRSP. 
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and Li (2013) and employ a one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement technique to test 
differences in liquidity levels between domestic and foreign US IPOs.19 Moreover, our results are robust to 
the exclusion of underpricing and of IPOs that took place during the bubble of 1999-2000 and to control for 
the different trading protocols on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Also, we confirm our results using quantile 
(median) regressions. As an alternative methodology, we run a full interaction model with all IPO shares and 
use dummies for foreign shares and again our main results are confirmed. These results are unreported for 
brevity, but are available from the authors on request. 
Finally, we conduct a battery of robustness tests with alternative measures of home country institutions 
with qualitatively similar results.20 In particular, we employ other indicators including (1) a continuous 
variable for HOME; (2) the original La Porta et al. (1998) anti-director index in line with Chung (2006) and 
Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006); (3) the law enforcement index from La Porta et al. (1998) 
f o l l o w i n g  Chung (2006) and Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006). Furthermore, we test for geographical 
distance, home bias, Economic Freedom index, Euromoney index, common vs. civil law, and cultural 
differences (Hofstede’s index following Tang and Koveos, 2008). We also follow Cumming, Johan and Li 
(2011) to consider (1) the price manipulation index, (2) the volume manipulation index, (3) the spoofing 
index, (4) the false disclosure index, (5) the market manipulation index, (6) the insider trading index, and (7) 
the broker-agency index, and to account for regulation changes, we consider the indexes individually and for 
the periods before and after the adoption in November 2007 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID). Consistent with our main results, we do not find the quality of the home country regulatory system 
to significantly influence the liquidity differences of foreign IPO shares listed in the US. 
                                                            
19 We also employ alternative specifications and confirm our results. These alternatives include radius matching, kernal-
based and bootstrap matching when the controls for selection are based on multiple observable firm characteristics. These 
include the natural logarithm of total assets in the last financial year preceding the IPO, Industry and year fixed effects, 
market-to-book ratio in in the first day of listing, leverage ratio, market return in the 30 days preceding the IPO, insider-
holding levels after the completion of the IPO, and the underpricing levels. Results are untabulated for brevity, but 
available from the authors upon request. 
20 Results are untabulated for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the liquidity patterns of foreign IPOs in US stock markets. As such, we extend 
the ongoing discussion in the IB literature regarding why foreign IPO firms choose to list abroad to reveal 
differences between IPO and cross-listed firms. We argue that foreign IPOs are fundamentally different from 
cross-listed firms studied previously, combining information problems associated with both the specific life-
cycle event of transitioning from private to public as well as informational and institutional differences. Whereas 
these features lend themselves to added bonding to the institutional environment in the US, the fact that foreign 
IPO firms have originated outside of the US could still subject them to a liability of foreignness in liquidity. 
Using a unique matched dataset, we compare liquidity levels of different time periods up to three years 
post-listing of foreign and domestic IPOs in the US. We find lower liquidity in foreign relative to domestic US 
IPOs in all the post-IPO time periods. However, in contrast to prior literature on liquidity in cross-country and 
cross-listing settings, we find that in foreign IPOs listed in the US, home country institutional environments 
do not play a significant role in determining liquidity levels as for cross-listed US listers. In addition, we 
document a relationship between the IPO characteristics and liquidity differentials. Specifically, greater 
underpricing for foreign as opposed to domestic IPOs is associated with lower liquidity differences in their 
shares. Thus, foreign shares are able to enjoy similar, or higher, levels of liquidity as domestic ones when they 
offer investors and dealers larger initial returns. Also, consistent with mature shares, we find that higher 
uncertainty, measured by volatility, is associated with greater liquidity differentials. Moreover, multiple listings 
in various markets is associated with reduced liquidity differentials. With respect to the liquidity motivation 
of listing abroad, we find that foreign IPO shares are more liquid than index shares in their home markets and 
matching IPOs in their home countries. Thus, although foreign IPOs enjoy higher liquidity relative to their 
home countries, they do not fully gain the benefits associated with liquid secondary markets to the same extent 
as domestic US IPOs. 
Collectively, these findings contribute to the debate surrounding the motivation of foreign firms to list in 
the US and provide useful evidence as to the applicability of certain theories such as bonding and avoidance 
as well as the liquidity theorem with respect to foreign IPOs. Together, our results suggest that foreign IPOs 
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differ in liquidity from both cross-listed firms and from domestic US IPOs. Our findings further suggest that 
this effect can be managed and potentially reduced if the legal, reporting, and enforcement settings that are 
available to investors in the primary market are also made available in the secondary market. 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
a. Firm characteristics 
Variables   Measurement Data source Expected Sign 
 
 
SIZE Total sales at year end prior to listing. Compustat and IPO Prospectus + 
BtoM Ratio of total asset at year end prior to listing over market 
capitalization at issue date. 
Compustat, CRSP and IPO - 
Prospectus 
LEV Ratio of total debt over total assets at year-end prior to 
listing. 
Compustat and IPO Prospectus - 
b. IPO characteristics 
Variables   Measurement Data source Expected Sign 
UP First day of trading returns (underpricing) defined   as the 
percentage difference between the closing stock price and 
the offer price at the first day of trading adjusted to market 
returns. 
Compustat, CRSP, SDC Platinum + 
and IPO Prospectus 
PROC Log of the proceedings from the IPOs. Compustat and IPO Prospectus + 
INSIDER Ownership of insiders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding. 
Compustat, SDC Platinum and IPO + 
Prospectus 
HOT Market returns in the 30 days previous to the IPO. CRSP + 
UW Underwriter Rank obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  SDC Platinum, IPO Prospectus and + 
Jay Ritter’s website on 06/11/2014. 
SOX Dummy set to 1 if IPO takes place on or after July 2002, 
and 0 otherwise. 
N/A + 
c. Share characteristics 
Variables   Measurement Data source Expected Sign 
 
 
RET Average daily returns in the month. CRSP + 
VOL Monthly standard deviation of daily returns. CRSP - 
HOLD Institutional investors holding of shares over total share 
outstanding available on a quarterly basis. 




Table 1 Foreign IPOs by Country and Time Period. 
 













South Africa 1 1 Austria 1 0 
   Belgium 2 0 
Americas 35 8 Denmark 1 0 
Argentina 2 1 Finland 1 0 
Brazil 1 0 France 14 0 
Canada 26 7 Germany 7 0 
Chile 3 0 Greece 3 12 
Mexico 3 0 Hungary 1 0 
Panama 2 0 Iceland 1 0 
   Ireland 8 3 
Asia 43 73 Israel 62 15 
China 7 58 Italy 7 1 
Hong Kong 17 4 Luxembourg 2 0 
India 2 2 Netherlands 26 4 
Indonesia 1 0 Norway 1 0 
Japan 2 0 Poland 1 0 
Jordan 1 0 Portugal 1 0 
Philippines 1 0 Russia 2 3 
Singapore 6 2 Spain 2 0 
South Korea 4 4 Sweden 3 0 
Taiwan 2 3 Switzerland 7 1 
   United Kingdom 30 2 
Oceania 6 0    
Australia 3 0    
New Zealand 3 0    
 





Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
 
 Domestic Foreign 
 
count mean sd count mean sd p-value 
SIZE 2156 16.71 4.02 357 17.33 3.32 0.01 
BtoM 2156 0.40 0.59 357 0.47 1.26 0.09 
LEV 2156 0.26 0.43 357 0.18 0.33 0.00 
UP 2156 0.24 0.41 357 0.26 0.46 0.64 
PROC 2156 17.81 0.87 357 18.24 1.65 0.00 
INSIDER 2156 0.71 0.14 357 0.73 0.14 0.02 
HOT 2156 0.03 0.06 357 0.03 0.08 0.56 
UW 2104 7.76 1.74 357 7.73 2.21 0.42 
RET1m 2111 0.08 1.13 356 0.03 2.58 0.47 
RET2m 2111 -0.05 1.02 356 -0.07 1.07 0.51 
RET3m 2111 0.04 0.99 356 0.02 1.04 0.71 
RET6m 2110 -0.11 1.05 356 -0.19 1.02 0.10 
RET9m 2101 -0.10 1.04 356 -0.21 0.99 0.07 
RET12m 2076 -0.09 1.01 354 -0.20 1.05 0.05 
RET24m 1849 -0.07 1.04 341 -0.11 1.13 0.50 
RET36m 1525 0.02 1.05 319 -0.02 1.04 0.58 
VOL1m 2111 4.21 2.47 356 4.06 2.89 0.34 
VOL2m 2109 4.23 2.21 356 4.30 2.48 0.41 
VOL3m 2110 4.29 2.26 356 4.17 2.25 0.46 
VOL6m 2109 4.53 2.72 356 4.36 2.44 0.29 
VOL9m 2099 4.49 2.59 356 4.45 2.72 0.88 
VOL12m 2085 4.54 2.65 354 4.63 3.11 0.34 
VOL24m 1860 4.51 2.91 341 4.75 3.04 0.07 
VOL36m 1574 4.53 2.91 318 4.84 4.14 0.06 
HOLD1-3m 2156 0.22 0.17 357 0.09 0.15 0.00 
HOLD6m 2156 0.18 0.13 357 0.11 0.17 0.00 
HOLD9m 2156 0.20 0.15 357 0.13 0.18 0.00 
HOLD12m 2156 0.33 0.23 357 0.13 0.19 0.00 
HOLD24m 2156 0.34 0.28 357 0.13 0.19 0.00 
HOLD36m 2156 0.31 0.31 357 0.12 0.21 0.00 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for all domestic and foreign shares in our sample in 
Panel A and the matched sample in Panel B. SIZE is total sales of firms at year-end prior to listing, BtoM is 
book-to-market ratio at year-end prior to listing, LEV is total debt over total assets at year-end prior to 
listing, UP is underpricing, PROC is log of the proceeds from the IPO, INSIDER is ratio of shares owned by 
insiders over total shares outstanding, HOT is market returns in the 30 days prior to listing, UW is underwriter 
quality, RET is monthly average returns of the shares, VOL is monthly standard deviation of daily returns 
and HOLD is share of institutional ownership. The last three measures are multiplied by 102. More details of 
the explanatory variables are reported in the Appendix. The last column reports the p-values of the t-test for the 







Table 3 Correlation Matrix. 
 
SIZE BtoM LEV UP PROC INSIDER HOT UW RET VOL 
BtoM 0.28          
LEV 0.08 0.14         
UP -0.04 -0.08 -0.12        
PROC 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.08       
INSIDER -0.05 -0.23 -0.11 0.22 -0.02      
HOT -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.24 -0.01 -0.02     
UW 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.55 0.12 -0.04    
RET 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02   
VOL -0.19 -0.17 -0.10 0.26 -0.16 0.13 0.07 -0.07 -0.06  
HOLD 0.12 0.11 0.11 -0.02 0.27 -0.16 -0.01 0.26 0.04 -0.17 
 
Notes: Correlation coefficients of the variables, averaged across foreign and matched domestic IPOs, are reported in the table. SIZE is total sales of 
firms at year-end prior to listing, BtoM is book-to-market ratio at year-end prior to listing, LEV is total debt over total assets at year-end prior to 
listing, UP is underpricing, HOT is market returns in the 30 days prior to listing, PROC is log of proceeds from the IPO, INSIDER is ratio of 
shares owned by insiders over total shares outstanding, UW is underwriter quality, RET is monthly average returns of shares, VOL is monthly 
standard deviation of daily returns, and HOLD is share of institutional ownership. The last three measures are multiplied by 102. More details of the 
explanatory variables are reported in the Appendix. 
 
 Table 4 Liquidity Differences Between Foreign and Domestic US IPOs. 
 
             Panel A 
 
    
 Mean Sd p-value  
∆LIQ1m 0.03 0.20 0.00 
∆LIQ2m 0.11 0.59 0.00 
∆LIQ3m 0.15 0.70 0.00 
∆LIQ6m 0.46 1.95 0.00 
∆LIQ9m 1.38 5.23 0.00 
∆LIQ12m 1.56 6.70 0.00 
∆LIQ24m 3.31 11.72 0.00 
∆LIQ36m 7.10 33.06 0.00 
         
             Panel B 
 
    
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 24m 36m 
α 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.59 1.51 1.37 3.87 9.61 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
∆SIZE 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.19 -0.84 
 (0.27) (0.40) (0.20) (0.63) (0.00) (0.77) (0.38) (0.12) 
∆BtoM 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.22 -0.64 1.07 
 (0.56) (0.94) (0.45) (0.42) (0.82) (0.26) (0.03) (0.53) 
∆LEV -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.23 -0.05 -0.58 -1.33 16.01 
 (0.84) (0.95) (0.81) (0.17) (0.91) (0.12) (0.18) (0.30) 
∆UP 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.73 1.67 2.84 2.00 4.50 
 (0.47) (0.07) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.32) 
∆HOT 0.13 0.29 0.08 -1.87 -5.54 -4.46 -18.63 -45.69 
 (0.35) (0.31) (0.78) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) 
∆PROC 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.25 0.40 0.44 0.37 4.00 
 (0.00) (0.73) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.08) (0.30) (0.04) 
∆UW 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.45 -0.12 -0.88 -1.17 
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.16) (0.53) (0.04) (0.13) 
∆INSIDER 0.19 0.43 0.43 1.26 0.13 3.35 -0.75 26.53 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.96) (0.21) (0.86) (0.16) 
∆RET 0.03 0.10 -0.08 0.52 1.19 1.73 5.34 1.36 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.82) (0.53) (0.75) (0.43) (0.04) (0.86) 
∆VOL 0.05 -0.17 -0.20 -0.59 -3.73 -4.57 -13.24 -11.18 
 (0.47) (0.45) (0.33) (0.16) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
∆HOLD -0.07 -0.16 -0.27 0.23 0.66 -0.14 3.13 14.33 
 (0.10) (0.29) (0.10) (0.40) (0.09) (0.84) (0.00) (0.05) 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.28 0.14 
Observ. 272 272 272 272 269 267 237 175 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the univariate test of differences in means of domestic and foreign liquidity measured 
by the Amihud ratio of the absolute daily returns over dollar trading volume averaged across each month for 
each stock, changed of sign and multiplied by 106. The last column reports the p-values. Panel B reports the 
results of regression (2) at different horizons after listing: 
 
∆ indicates differences between the matching domestic and foreign variables. Firm characteristic variables 
are: SIZE for size, BtoM for book to market, LEV for leverage ratio. IPO characteristics variables are: UP 
for underpricing, PROC for IPO proceedings, INSIDER for insider ownership, HOT for market returns in 
the month prior the listing, UW for underwriter quality. Stock characteristics variables are: RET for return, 
VOL for volatility, HOLD for institutional investor ownership. More details of the explanatory variables are 
reported in the Appendix. p-values are reported below the coefficients. 
, , , ,
for  = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24 and 36 months.
i m m m i m m i m m i m mLIQ FIRM IPO STOCK
m
α β γ δ ε∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
  
Table 5 Global IPOs. 
 
             Panel A 
 
    
 Mean Sd p-value 
∆LIQ1m 0.04 0.23 0.04 
∆LIQ2m 0.13 0.69 0.04 
∆LIQ3m 0.12 0.77 0.07 
∆LIQ6m 0.43 2.57 0.06 
∆LIQ9m 1.12 5.47 0.03 
∆LIQ12m 1.79 7.74 0.02 
∆LIQ24m 2.75 8.87 0.00 
∆LIQ36m 7.89 39.35 0.07 
         
 
    Panel B   
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 24m 36m 
α 0.035 0.14 0.23 0.84 2.79 3.35 3.14 2.36 
 (0.75) (0.54) (0.29) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.39) 
∆SIZE 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.34 -0.10 -0.12 0.049 1.20 
 (0.92) 
 
(0.77) (0.57) (0.38) (0.11) (0.46) (0.71) (0.39) 
∆BtoM -0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.34 -0.12 -0.32 -1.87 
 (0.86) (0.74) (0.24) (0.71) (0.21) (0.79) (0.04) (0.46) 
∆LEV 0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.22 1.02 0.08 -0.23 -2.66 
 (0.61) (0.15) (0.89) (0.50) (0.09) (0.90) (0.74) (0.64) 
∆UP -0.00 0.02 0.20 0.89 1.16 3.40 3.89 21.59 
 (0.95) (0.87) (0.34) (0.10) (0.25) (0.23) (0.01) (0.32) 
∆HOT 0.34 0.89 -0.43 -4.63 -7.40 -18.21 -35.11 -70.40 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.53) (0.15) (0.21) (0.03) (0.18) (0.45) 
∆PROC 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.54 0.27 0.41 -0.34 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.51) (0.84) (0.40) (0.75) (0.33) (0.83) 
∆UW -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.24 -0.65 0.86 -0.20 0.77 
 (0.51) (0.81) (0.16) (0.27) (0.24) (0.14) (0.40) (0.54) 
∆INSIDER 0.33 1.14 0.41 0.94 0.50 0.58 2.36 -5.59 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.75) (0.74) (0.59) (0.66) 
∆RET 0.08 1.33 1.08 0.77 1.99 -5.49 7.84 -7.44 
 (0.34) (0.05) (0.22) (0.46) (0.76) (0.43) (0.50) (0.76) 
∆VOL -0.04 -0.76 -0.57 -1.63 -2.23 -9.46 -7.15 0.11 
 (0.81) (0.25) (0.29) (0.12) (0.25) (0.01) (0.02) (0.95) 
∆HOLD -0.17 -0.51 -0.31 -0.27 2.39 -0.31 2.19 -13.55 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.28) (0.69) (0.16) (0.93) (0.48) (0.40) 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.25 
Observ. 73 73 73 73 71 71 64 40 
 
 
Notes: For the foreign IPOs that list in multiple markets, Panel A reports the univariate test of differences in 
means of domestic and foreign liquidity. The last column reports the p-values. Panel B reports the results of 
regression (2) at different horizons after listing: 
 
∆ indicates differences between the matching domestic and foreign variables. Firm characteristic variables 
are: SIZE for size, BtoM for book to market, LEV for leverage ratio. IPO characteristics variables are: UP 
for underpricing, PROC for IPO proceedings, INSIDER for insider ownership, HOT for market returns in 
the month prior the listing, UW for underwriter quality. Stock characteristics variables are: RET for return, 
VOL for volatility, HOLD for institutional investor ownership. More details of the explanatory variables are 
reported in the Appendix. p-values are reported below the coefficients. 
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Weak Strong  
 count mean count mean p-value 
LIQ1m 178 -0.06 160 -0.08 0.69 
LIQ2m 178 -0.16 160 -0.22 0.39 
LIQ3m 178 -0.19 160 -0.30 0.15 
LIQ6m 178 -0.62 160 -0.80 0.07 
LIQ9m 178 -1.48 160 -1.68 0.16 
LIQ12m 177 -1.69 159 -1.93 0.23 
LIQ24m 170 -4.23 154 -4.08 0.56 
LIQ36m 154 -4.37 148 -9.28 0.01 
     
 
    
    Panel B 
 
    
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 24m 36m 
HOME -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 
 (0.58) (0.55) (0.08) (0.39) (0.69) (0.28) (0.42) (0.59) 
SIZE -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.34 -0.44 
 (0.46) (0.24) (0.52) (0.42) (0.45) (0.70) (0.48) (0.25) 
BtoM -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -1.17 
 (0.50) (0.83) (0.94) (0.70) (0.77) (0.89) (0.90) (0.53) 
LEV 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.37 1.13 -0.11 -5.48 3.98 
 (0.22) (0.10) (0.08) (0.29) (0.15) (0.55) (0.09) (0.60) 
UP 0.04 0.19 0.20 0.97 2.26 3.61 2.62 6.89 
 (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.13) 
PROC 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.32 0.11 -0.05 
 (0.12) (0.58) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.01) (0.48) (0.17) 
INSIDER 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.30 3.54 -2.78 7.10 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.06) (0.53) (0.99) (0.15) (0.74) (0.44) 
HOT 0.07 0.79 0.47 0.86 -6.10 -2.95 2.49 -18.45 
 (0.99) (0.37) (0.42) (0.49) (0.53) (0.78) (0.70) (0.30) 
UW 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.93 1.99 
 (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.88) (0.08) (0.22) 
SOX 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.57 2.26 0.63 4.65 4.00 
 (0.44) (0.10) (0.38) (0.50) (0.17) (0.71) (0.36) (0.80) 
RET 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.16 0.04 0.60 0.81 1.21 
 (0.77) (0.49) (0.97) (0.92) (0.37) (0.29) (0.32) (0.83) 
VOL -0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.22 -0.52 -0.71 -2.13 -2.72 
 (0.59) (0.31) (0.15) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
HOLD 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.01 1.82 -0.12 3.87 2.71 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.95) (0.44) (0.95) (0.26) (0.68) 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.34 0.20 
Observ 337 337 337 337 337 335 323 300 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the univariate test of differences in means. The last column reports the p-values. Panel B 
reports the results of regression (3) at different horizons after listing:  
, , , , ,  
 1, 2,3,6,9,12,24 and 36 months.
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The regression is estimated at different horizons after listing and the results are reported in different columns. 
HOME is the indicator of home country institutions. Firm characteristic variables are: SIZE for size, BtoM 
for book to market, LEV for leverage ratio. IPO characteristics variables are: UP for underpricing, PROC for 
IPO proceedings, INSIDER for insider ownership, HOT for market returns in the month prior the listing, 
UW for underwriter quality, SOX for listing following the introduction of the SOX Act. Stock characteristics 
variables are: RET for return, VOL for volatility, HOLD for institutional investor ownership. More details of 
the explanatory variables are reported in the Appendix. p-values are reported below the coefficients. 
  
Table 7 Spreads as Alternative Liquidity Measures. 
 
             Panel A 
 
    
 Mean Sd p-value  
∆LIQ1m -0.04 0.05 0.00 
∆LIQ2m -0.04 0.04 0.00 
∆LIQ3m -0.03 0.05 0.00 
∆LIQ6m -0.03 0.05 0.00 
∆LIQ9m -0.04 0.06 0.00 
∆LIQ12m -0.04 0.06 0.00 
∆LIQ24m -0.04 0.07 0.00 
∆LIQ36m -0.04 0.06 0.00 
         
             Panel B 
 
    
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 24m 36m 
α -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
∆SIZE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.00) (0.79) (0.16) (0.64) (0.91) 
∆BtoM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.99) (0.15) (0.68) (0.96) (0.41) (0.66) 
∆LEV -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.60) (0.24) (0.27) (0.67) (0.50) (0.92) 
∆UP -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.20) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
∆HOT 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.13 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.27) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00) 
∆PROC -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.40) (0.05) (0.04) 
∆UW -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.36) (0.17) (0.58) (0.44) (0.35) (0.13) (0.90) (0.40) 
∆INSIDER 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.92) (0.35) (0.93) (0.88) (0.77) (0.69) (0.65) (0.00) 
∆RET -0.03 -0.20 0.26 0.03 -0.02 -1.02 -0.26 -0.31 
 (0.73) (0.20) (0.05) (0.76) (0.95) (0.00) (0.47) (0.49) 
∆VOL 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
∆HOLD 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.41) (0.79) (0.22) (0.32) (0.22) (0.56) (0.20) (0.05) 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.25 
Observ. 258 259 249 249 234 231 210 163 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the univariate test of differences in means of domestic and foreign spreads. The last 
column reports the p-values. Panel B reports the results of regression (2) at different horizons after listing: 
 
∆ indicates differences between the matching domestic and foreign variables. Firm characteristic variables 
are: SIZE for size, BtoM for book to market, LEV for leverage ratio. IPO characteristics variables are: UP 
for underpricing, PROC for IPO proceedings, INSIDER for insider ownership, HOT for market returns in 
the month prior the listing, UW for underwriter quality. Stock characteristics variables are: RET for return, 
VOL for volatility, HOLD for institutional investor ownership. More details of the explanatory variables are 
reported in the Appendix. p-values are reported below the coefficients. 
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for  = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24 and 36 months.
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Figure 1 Liquidity of shares for foreign and matching US domestic IPOs. 
 
Panel A: Amihud ratio 
 
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads 
 
Notes: Liquidity levels of shares for foreign and matching domestic IPOs at monthly horizons after listing 
are plotted in Panel A. Liquidity is estimated as the Amihud ratio with opposite sign and multiplied by 
106. In Panel A the matching domestic measures are an order of magnitude smaller on average, so they are 
plotted against a secondary axis for more clarity. Panel B reports the percentage bid-ask spreads for foreign 
and matching domestic IPOs at monthly horizons after listing. 
